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PROCESS-United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978).
Henry Neville and William Twigg were convicted by a jury of
the illegal manufacture of methamphetamnine hydrochloride (speed).'
The facts revealed that Robert Kubica, arrested in May, 1976, for the
illegal manufacture of speed, agreed thereafter to assist the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) by serving as an informant. 2 Accordingly, pursuant to a request by DEA officials, Kubica telephoned

Neville in October, 1976, and proposed that they establish a speed
laboratory. 3 Over the next several months, Kubica and Neville formulated plans defining the roles that each was to play: Kubica would
locate a site for production and obtain necessary equipment and ingredients while Neville would tend to acquisition of funds and dis4
tribution of the drug.
The government proceeded to furnish Kubica with phenyl-2propanone, a chemical indispensable to the manufacture of speed and
yet the most difficult to procure. 5 In addition, DEA officials rented a
farmhouse to serve as the location for the laboratory, provided
glassware for the narcotics operation, and established arrangements
with chemical supply houses whereby Kubica would be able to
purchase other requisite materials. 6 Neville contributed $1,500

I United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373, 374 (3d Cir. 1978). Specifically, the two defendants were found guilty, of conspiracy to manufacture and possess with intent to distribute a
controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1976), 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1976); and manufacture of a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976). Neville was additional]x, convicted of use of a telephone to implement the manufacture of a controlled substance, 21
U.S.C. § 843(b) (1976), 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1976); and possession of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (1976). 588 F.2d at 374-75.
2 588 F.2d at 375. Kubica had pled guilty and received a four-year sentence, out of which
was born his collaboration with the DEA to impede illicit narcotics traffic. Id. See note 86
infra.
a 588 F.2d at 375. Kubica and Neville had been acquainted for twenty years and, in fact,
had managed a speed laboratory together in 1973, producing several pounds of the amphetamine. The record does not otherwise indicate the reason for DEA attention to Neville. Id.
at n.2.
4 Id. at 375. Using equipment supplied by the DEA, Kubica recorded certain telephone
conversations between the two discussing such operations. Id.
5 Id. Government agents financed the supply of two and one-half gallons of phenyl-2propanone at a cost of $475. Id.
6 Id. at 375-76. The informant conducted such business with chemical supply houses
under the name of -Chem Kleen.' Id. at 376.
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which Kubica used to acquire the apparatus. 7 On March 1, 1977,
William Twigg became involved with Neville in the criminal enterprise, apparently to repay a debt he owed to the latter. 8 On the
same day, laboratory construction within the farmhouse was completed. 9
Kubica, the sole party possessing chemical knowledge, took
charge during the manufacturing phase of the venture, soliciting
minor tasks to be performed by Neville and Twigg. 10 Approximately
six pounds of the drug was produced within a week. 1 Neville departed from the farmhouse on March 7, carrying the criminal "fruit"
in a suitcase and was arrested by DEA officials while driving away. 12
13
The farmhouse was raided and Twigg placed under arrest.
On appeal, Neville and Twigg did not raise a traditional entrapment defense but claimed that the extent of police involvement in the
crime constituted a violation of their rights to due process.' 4 Judge
Rosenn, speaking for the majority in United States v. Twigg, 15 held
that although the defendants were not entrapped as a matter of law,
"governmental involvement in the criminal activities of this case ...
reached 'a demonstrable level of outrageousness.' "16 The defendants' convictions were reversed 17 on the ground of fundamental
fairness inherent in the due process clause of the fifth amendment. 18

7 id. at 376. Neville thus financed approximately eighty percent of the chemicals and instruments. Id. at 384 (Adams, J., dissenting).
' Id. at 376. Twigg's participation in the scheme was significantly less than that of Neville.
See id. at 381-82. Twigg did accompany Kubica to various chemical distribution centers, id. at
376, and, at Kubica's order, purchased a separator, funnel. Id. at 380.
9 Id. at 376.

10 Id. at 376, 380-81. Twigg was often directed to run errands at local stores for food and
drink, while Neville passed a considerable amount of time away from the farmhouse, id. at 376,
to arrange for sale of the amphetamine. Petition for Rehearing in Banc at 4, United States v.

Twigg, No. 78-1315 (3d Cir., filed Jan. 17, 1978).
"5 588 F.2d at 376.

Id. Quantities of cocaine and speed, in addition to the drugs contained in the suitcase,
were discovered during the search of Neville's car. Id.
13 Id. Kubica prompted the raid on the defendants by contacting DEA officials. Id.
14 Id. at 375. An entrapment defense is normally predicated upon the lack of the accused's
predisposition to commit the crime. At trial, the jury found that Neville and Twigg were predisposed and, consequently, not entrapped. Id. at 376. This finding was not contested upon
appeal. Id. at 376 n.5.
Neville also argued that the search warrant was invalid and that the jury received erroneous instructions on reasonable doubt. Id. at 375 n. 1.The Third Circuit held such contentions to
be without merit. Id.
15 588 F.2d at 373 (3d Cir. 1978).
16 Id. at 376, 380.
" Id. at 375. Neville's conviction for possession of cocaine was the only count sustained. Id.
18 See id. at 377, 381.
12
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Dissenting, Judge Adams countered that the facts in the case at bar
did not support a constitutional framework of review; 19 undercover
police action in Twigg was merely comparable to that found in other
20
cases dismissing such a defense.
The impact and ramifications of Twigg's successful departure
from the traditional entrapment defense can best be understood by
first positioning the case in relation to the history of federal entrapment law. In 1932, the Supreme Court of the United States created
precedent 2 l when it sustained the defense of entrapment in Sorrells
v. United States. 2 2 Chief Justice Hughes, in formulating the

19 Id. at 383 (Adams, J., dissenting).
Id. at 386-89 (Adams, J., dissenting).
21 Two significant decisions precede this date. The landmark case of Woo Wai v. United
20

States in 1915 marks the first occasion that a federal circuit court finds entrapment. See Woo
Wai v. United States, 223 F. 412, 415 (9th Cir. 1915). There, Immigration Commission agents
approached the defendant and proposed a scheme for illegal importations of Chinese into the
United States. Id. at 413. Woo Wai declined the offer, and for approximately one and one-half
years the officers urged his participation through letters, personal visits, and repeated assurances as to the manner in which the plan would be safely implemented. Id. at 413-14. Woo
Wai finally acquiesced. Id. at 414. The court noticed the absence of evidence demonstrating
that the defendant had previously been engaged in such illicit importations, id., and held that
public policy prohibited a conviction obtained where the "criminal intention to commit the
offense had its origin" in the minds of the government agents. Id. at 415.
In Casey v. United States, the Supreme Court, through Justice Holmes, declined to find
the existence of entrapment. Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413 (1928). Casey, a lawyer
suspected of smuggling drugs to his prisoner-clients addicted to morphine, was exposed by
federal officials. Id. at 422 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The agents had installed a dictaphone to
overhear the defendant's conversation with certain prisoners who previously agreed to cooperate
with the government and to purposefully request the supply of drugs from the defendant. Id.
The case is noted here for the opinion proffered by Justice Brandeis in his dissent, who stated
that although the government may profit by stratagem used to catch a criminal, it "may not
provoke or create a crime and then punish the criminal, its creature." Id. at 423 (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting). For the Court to permit conviction of a "detective-made criminal" is "tantamount to
a ratification by the Government of the officers' unauthorized and unjustifiable conduct." Id. at
423-24 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The Justice stressed that the prosecution in the case sub
judice must be defeated, independent of any asserted right of the accused, in order to shield
the integrity of courts and governmental entities. Id. at 425 (Brandeis, J.,dissenting). Justice
Brandeis herein issued the seed of subsequent Supreme Court deliberation regarding the entrapment defense. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 483 (1976); United States v. Russell,
411 U.S. 423 (1973); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958); Sorrells v. United States,
287 U.S. 435 (1932). These cases are discussed at length at notes 22-69 infra and accompanying
text.
22 287 U.S. 435 (1932). A prohibition officer posing as a tourist approached the defendant,
initiated conversation, and inquired without success whether any liquor could be obtained. Id.
at 439. A second request met with a second refusal. Id. Further conversation in which the
officer shared common war experiences with the defendant and played upon the latter's sympathies led to a third request for liquor which was fulfilled. Id. The Court, in upholding the
entrapment defense, reasoned that the defendant had been an innocent citizen with no prior
disposition to commit the unlawful act. Id. at 441, 448. The plan was deemed to originate in the
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parameters of the defense, held that ruse and artifice were properly
within the arsenal of government agents when utilized to expose unlawful undertakings. 23 Prosecution would not be undermined merely
because government officers provided an opportunity for the potential
defendant to commit the crime. 24 However, "[a] different question
is presented when the criminal design originates with the officials of
the Government, and they implant in the mind of an innocent person
the disposition to commit the alleged offense .... "25 The Court thus
drew a distinction between preventing crime and creating it; 26 should
the latter be deemed to occur, the government may be estopped
from prosecution in the interest of public policy. 27 Chief Justice
Hughes concluded that it belies congressional intent in enacting a
criminal statute to allow its enforcement to be abused by government
agents' instigation of the very act they wish to punish. 28 The Sorrells
Court herein set forth a statutory intent/subjective analysis approach
to entrapment which concentrates on the conduct of the defendant
and the absence or presence of his predisposition to commit the
crime. 29
In a separate opinion, Justice Roberts offered an alternative view
of the basis for the entrapment doctrine: public policy, rather than
congressional intent, forbids a conviction where a governmental official visualizes the crime and induces its performance by one not intending to so act. 3 0 It is the role of the judicial tribunal to prevent
the debasement of governmental decency and to preserve the "purity
of its own temple" by refusing to sanction such abuse of the criminal
law.31 "[C]ourts must be closed to the trial of a crime instigated by
mind of the agent rather than in the mind of the defendant and, as such, was a "creature" of the
agent's "purpose." Id. at 441.
23 Id. at 441.
24
25
26

Id.
Id. at 442.
Id. at 444. Chief Justice Hughes relied on federal case law of the Eighth Circuit. See

Butts v. United States, 273 F. 35, 38 (8th Cir. 1921).

27 The Sorrells Court referred to a Fourth Circuit opinion. See Newman v. United States,
299 F. 128, 131 (4th Cir. 1924).
28

287 U.S. at 448.

Although eight members of the Court agreed as to the finding of entrapment, they differed as to the legal basis for the defense. Id. at 453 (Roberts, J., concurring). This subjective
determination of entrapment, however, continues to represent the controlling position of the
Supreme Court today. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 483 (1976); United States v.
Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
30 287 U.S. at 454-55 (Roberts, J., concurring). The manipulation of deceptive practices to
expose ongoing crime is otherwise permissible in regard to society's "war with the criminal
classes." Id. at 453.
31 Id. at 457.
29
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the government's own agents." 3 2 This perspective will be considered by later courts to constitute the public policy/objective approach to entrapment which concentrates on the conduct of the government and the absence or presence of overreaching and instigative
33
design in its actions.
The Supreme Court reviewed the structure of the entrapment
defense twenty-six years later in Sherman v. United States.34 Chief
Justice Warren, delivering the opinion of the Court, essentially reaffirmed the analysis presented by the Sorrells majority, 3 5 and advised
that subterfuge is a viable weapon of the government in the battle
against illicit sales of narcotics. 3 6 Yet boundaries are imposed upon
the overzealous police official; the duty of law enforcement officers
encompasses the deterrence of crime, but never its causation.3 7 Congress does not intend its statutes to be corrupted by permitting the
prosecution of violations where a "criminal design" springs from the
mind of an official who sows the seeds of disposition in an otherwise
innocent person. 38 The Sherman Court, capsulizing the subjective
approach to entrapment enunciated in Sorrells, confirmed that "[t]o
determine whether entrapment has been established, a line must be
drawn between the trap for the unwary innocent and the trap for the
39
unwary criminal."

32 Id.

at 459.

33 Even if the defendant lacks predisposition and is "otherwise innocent," he is nevertheless
"guilty" since he does in fact commit the act. Id. at 456. It is the role of the government in the
crime which serves to defeat the prosecution. Id. at 454-56. This alternative announced by
Justice Roberts retains the minority support of the Supreme Court today. See Hampton v.
United States, 425 U.S. 483, 495 (Brennan, J., dissenting); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S.
423, 436 (Douglas, J., dissenting) and 439 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
- 356 U.S. 369 (1958). A government informer, Kalchinian, encountered the defendant several times at a doctor's office where both were under treatment for drug addiction. Id. at 371.
Chance meetings established a rapport and frank discussion between the two of attempts to
overcome the habit. Id. Kalchinian complained that the treatment was failing and repeatedly
implored the defendant to provide him with a source of narcotics until the latter finally acquiesced. Id. A unanimous Court held that the defendant had been entrapped. Id. at 373. As in
SorreUs, though, the Justices disagreed in regard to the legal foundation for the defense of
entrapment and the proper formula to apply. Id. at 378 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
35 Id. at 376-77.
36 Id. at 372.
37 Id.
38 Id. "Then stealth and strategy become as objectionable police methods as the coerced
confession and the unlawful search." id. Justice Frankfurter, extending the analogy in his concurrence, explained that statutes are silent on the issues of entrapment as they are silent on the
issue of suppression of illegally obtained evidence. Id. at 381 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Yet
congressional enactments presuppose a supervisory power of the courts to grant the defense. Id.
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
39 Id. at 372.
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A concurring opinion, however, advocated a reexamination of the
Sorrells rule. 40 Justice Frankfurter, echoing in part the words of
Justice Roberts, criticized the reasoning of the majority as fallacious
in its insistence that congressional intent supports and founds the
doctrine of entrapment. 4 1 Rather, the defendant's guilt is engendered in the very violation of the statute. 4 2 "[C]onduct is not less
criminal because [it is] the result of temptation." 4 3 Yet the prosecution falters due to the objectionable methods used by the government, for public trust decries the judicial tribunal from sanctioning a
lawless enforcement of the law. 44 The proper objective test, then, in
evaluating the presence of entrapment, should focus on the acts of
the government; any predisposition on the part of the defendant is
irrelevant to a determination since it is not linked to the underlying
rationale for the doctrine. 4 5 Justice Frankfurter observed that a
case-by-case inspection is necessary to a finding of reprehensible
police action likely to persuade persons not otherwise "ready and willing" to carry out the offense. 46 Factors to be considered would include the manner of inducement, the type of crime involved, and the
difficulty of the investigation. 4 7 In essence, Justice Frankfurter counseled a stalwart public policy approach to entrapment that shifts attention away from the accused to the quality of police behavior, and
48
called upon the courts to administer justice accordingly.
In 1973, a divided Supreme Court confronted the issue of entrapment again in United States v. Russell.4 9 Justice Rehnquist, writ-

Id. at 378-79 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
41 Id. at 379-80 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
42 Id. (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
43 Id. at 380 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Id. (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter quoted Justice Holmes, dissenting in
Olmstead v. United States: "(l]t [is] less evil that some criminals should escape than that the
Government should play an ignoble part.'" Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1938)
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
45 356 U.S. at 382-83. (Frankfurter, J., concurring). "Permissible police activity does not
vary according to the particular defendant concerned." Id. at 383 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
40 Id. at 384 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
47 Id. at 384-85 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
48 Id. at 378-85 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
49 411 U.S. 423 (1973). An undercover agent for the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs supplied the defendants, already engaged in the manufacture of speed, with
an essential scarce ingredient known as phenyl-2-propanone (P-2-P). Id. at 425. The officer did
not otherwise become involved in the manufacture of the amphetamine and a subsequent search
of the defendants' laboratory revealed an additional bottle of P-2-P. Id. at 425-26. The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the conviction of the district court on the ground that
"' an intolerable degree of governmental participation in the criminal enterprise' " mandated
dismissal of the case, regardless of the defendant's conceded predisposition. Id. at 274 (quoting
40
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ing for the majority, reasserted the holdings of Sorrells and Sherman
and emphasized the predominant importance of the defendant's predisposition in any delicate balance between criminal tendency and
governmental influence to commit the crime. 50 Infiltration by police
officials into criminal narcotics operations and limited participation in
such activities are proper investigatory tactics which do not violate an
individual's constitutional rights. 5 1 Moreover, since the defense of
entrapment does not rest in the heritage of the nation's Constitution,
then absent encroachment upon some independent right of the accused, the twin constituents of due process and fundamental fairness
do not arise. 5 2 In dicta, however, Justice Rehnquist admitted that
"we may some day be presented with a situation in which the conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process
principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial
processes to obtain a conviction." 53 Perhaps unwittingly, he thus
heralds the due process approach to entrapment, as later cases, including Twigg, will testify. 54 Yet the due process rationale was not
United States v. Russell, 459 F.2d 671, 672 (9th Cir. 1972)). Two alternative theories were
introduced to support this proposition. Id. First, the court alluded to a line of recent cases
holding that entrapment occurs as a matter of law whenever the government provides the accused with contraband. Id. at 427-28. See United States v. Bueno, 447 F.2d 903 (5th Cir.
1971); United States v. Chisum, 312 F. Supp. 1307 (C.D. Cal. 1970). Second, the "nonentrapment rationale" of Greene v. United States, another Ninth Circuit decision, recognized
that an excessive degree of governmental enmeshing in the criminal act is "repugnant" to a
system of justice. 411 U.S. at 428. See Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971).
The court of appeals in Russell unified these two strands of defense and reversed conviction on
the ground of due process and fundamental fairness. 411 U.S. at 428. The Supreme Court
reversed. Id. at 436.
50 411 U.S. at 433-34.
51 Id. at 432. It is also permissible, then, for government agents to supply a drug ring with
some item of value.'" Id.
52 Id. at 430. Any analogy between entrapment and the exclusionary rule applied to illegal
search and seizures is thus flawed, according to the Court, since in the latter situation an
independent constitutional right is infringed. Id.
53 Id. at 431-32. Justice Rehnquist implied that for an accused to benefit from such a remedy despite his predisposition, the governmental acts would have to be as grossly shocking as
those demonstrated in Rochin v. California. Id. There, police officers took the defendant to a
hospital and forced an emetic into his stomach so that he would vomit two capsules of morphine, which the officers subsequently used as proof of narcotics possession. Id. Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
54 In 1971, the Ninth Circuit foreshadowed the admission of Justice Rehnquist and witnessed the birth of the due process variation to entrapment. Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d
783, 788 (9th Cir. 1971) (Merrill, J., dissenting). See also note 49 supra.
In 1973, Judge Friendly in United States v. Archer responded to Justice Rehnquist's dicta
in Russell and related the role of due process to effective law enforcement:
[T]here is certainly a limit to allowing governmental involvement in crime. It would
be unthinkable, for example, to permit government agents to instigate robberies
and beatings merely to gather evidence to convict other members of a gang of
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adopted by the dissenting Justices in Russell, 55 who supported the
public policy/objective test established by the minority opinions in
Sorrells and Sherman.5 6
Justice Rehnquist maintained a traditional posture in Hampton v.
United States,5 7 a 1976 case decided by a plurality of the Court. 58 In
reaffirming the majority stance of Sorrells, Sherman and Russell, he
posited that entrapment arises only where government agents initiate
the criminal pattern. 59 Therefore, the essential question deals with
the intent of the accused to commit the offense; where predisposition
exists, entrapment does not. 60 In regard to the supervisory role of
the courts, Justice Rehnquist warned that the defense is not to serve
as a vehicle for the federal judiciary to give a " 'chancellor's foot'

hoodlums. Governmental "investigation" involving participation in activities that result in injury to the rights of its citizens is a course that courts should be extremely
reluctant to sanction. Prosecutors and their agents naturally tend to assign great
weight to the societal interest in apprehending and convicting criminals; the danger
is that they will assign too little to the rights of citizens to be free from
government-induced criminality.
United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 676-77 (2d Cir. 1973) (footnote omitted).
55 411 U.S. at 437-39 (Douglas, J., dissenting) and 439-49 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
56 Id. Justice Stewart indicated that several federal courts presently adhere to the objective
test as enunciated by Justice Roberts and Justice Frankfurter, which stresses the conduct of the
police officer rather than the intent of the defendant as the dispositive element in a finding of
entrapment. Id. at 445-46 n.3. Furthermore, a majority of the commentators prefer the objective reasoning. Id. See, e.g., the ALI MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (Official Draft 1962), which
defines entrapment to include "methods of persuasion or inducement [used by a public law
enforcement official] which creates a substantial risk that such an offense will be committed by
persons other than those who are ready to commit it." ALI MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (Official
Draft 1962). See also the revised New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice which adopts an identical
passage. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-12(a)(2) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
Justice Stewart also faulted the predisposition/subjective formula as misleading, unreliable
and prejudicial to the defendant in that it allows into evidence hearsay and past criminal convictions to prove intent. 411 U.S. at 443-44 (Stewart, J., dissenting). For further discussion of the
admission and exclusion of evidence where entrapment is at issue, see Park, The Entrapment
Controversy, 60 MINN. L. REv. 163, 200 (1976). See also note 106 infra and accompanying text.
57 425 U.S. 483 (1976).
58 Id. The parties differed as to the facts. According to the government, the defendant met
Hutton, an acquaintance who was also a DEA informant, and offered to sell a quantity of heroin
if a buyer could be located. Id. at 485-86. The sale was transacted through the informant and a
DEA official posing as a narcotics dealer. Id. at 486. According to the defendant, however, he
was in need of cash, and Hutton had suggested selling a non-narcotic drug which could produce
the same effects as heroin and which he offered to obtain from a friend. Id. at 486-87. The two
might then distribute the drug for profit to persons who would believe they were buying heroin. Id. at 487. The defendant argued that he did not intend to sell heroin and claimed that he
was entrapped or, in the alternative, that his due process rights were violated by egregious
police tactics. Id.
59 Id. at 488-89.
60 Id.
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veto" to governmental action of which it disapproves. 6 1 Instead, fifth
amendment due process rights are viable avenues only where police
62
action has infringed upon a constitutional right of the individual.
Justice Powell, concurring, refrained from a per se negation of
due process concepts whenever the defendant is deemed predisposed6a3 Since the measure of potential criminal involvement is variable, a tribunal of justice should remain flexible in accordance with its
supervisory role and exercise of discretion under the circumstances."
The Justice conceded that "the cases, if any, in which
proof of predisposition is not dispositive will be rare." 65 Yet in a
threshold formulation of the due process alternative to entrapment,
he declared that where "[p]olice overinvolvement in crime . . .
reach[es] a demonstrable level of outrageousness" conviction will be
66
barred.
A dissent forwarded by Justice Brennan, however, recalled the
public policy view of entrapment bequeathed by the concurrences in
Sherman and Sorrells and the dissent in Russell. 6 7 Entrapment may
occur despite the conceded guilt of the accused where inquiry discloses unconscionable police methods utilized to obtain conviction.6 8
Overall, Hampton is a case of momentous import because it has been
interpreted as allowing a due process defense founded on the out69
rageous nature of police behavior.
Federal entrapment law has followed a trajectory that is
highlighted by the Supreme Court's recognition of three possible
analyses. A subjective vision of entrapment, which has tended to hold
the sway of the Court, features the defense as statutory in origin and
studies the "genesis of the intent" to commit the crime. 70 An objec-

61

Id. at 490.

62

Id.

Furthermore, if the police do act in an illegal manner toward the defendant, the

proper solution lies in prosecution of the police rather than release of the defendant. Id.
63 Id. at 495 (Powell, J., concurring).
64 Id. at 494 n.5, 495 (Powell, J., concurring). See also note 38 supra.

Id. at 495 n.7 (Powell, J., concurring).
Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
617Id. at 495-96 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
65
66

68 Id.

(Brennan, J., dissenting).
69 See United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d at 378-79 (fundamental fairness prohibits conviction

where police conduct "outrageous"); United States v. Prairie, 572 F.2d 1316, 1319 (9th Cir.
1978) (due process defense based on outrageous nature of government conduct); United States
v. Leja, 563 F.2d 244, 246 (6th Cir. 1977) (over-involvement of government agents may violate
due process or warrant reversal under court's supervisory powers).
70 Donnelly, Judicial Control of InfornmanPts, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agent Provocateurs,
60 YALE L.J. 1091, 1102 (1951).
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tive explanation of entrapment, favored among the commentators, is
rooted in public policy and discourages the sullying effect on the judicial process which would succeed any sanction of tainted governmental behavior. 7 1 Finally, a due process/fundamental fairness concern is
an emerging trend, still in its infancy, which seeks to maximize the
freedom of the individual to be constitutionally protected from perva72
sive police action in the criminal context.
An understanding of the theories espoused by the court in
United States v. Twigg begins by relating the case to the law which
precedes it. Judge Rosenn, speaking for the Third Circuit, found that
an intolerable degree of governmental involvement in the criminal
manufacture of speed unjustifiably imposed upon the defendants' constitutional liberties inherent in the due process clause of the fifth
amendment. 73 Neville's predisposition to commit the offense had
foreclosed any contention of traditional entrapment; 74 Twigg was precluded ab initio from raising the defense since he had not been
75
solicited to partake in the venture by a law enforcement officer.
Prosecution was held to be barred, instead, by the flagrant nature of
76
police activity.
The court believed that the factual history present in Twigg was
distinguishable from prior Supreme Court case law which had repudiated the fundamental fairness alternative. 77 Russell had dealt
with infiltration of a drug ring already in existence, 78 whereas in
Twigg the criminal plan materialized at the behest of a government
informer who recommended the scheme to a law-abiding citizen. 79
Hampton had centered on the sale of drugs as opposed to their manufacture in Twigg, 80 but the same discrepancy existed between the

71 United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. at 445-46 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Donnelly, supra
note 70, at 1102.
72 See Comment, Hampton v. United States: Last Rites for the "Objective" Theory of En-

trapment?, 9 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 223, 260 (1977).
73 588 F.2d at 377, 380-81.

74 Id. at 376. Kubica testified in regard to their joint manufacture of speed several years
antecedent, id., and to Neville's willingness to recreate the lab upon Kubica's stimulus. Id. at
381. Neville failed to offer any evidence that he was not predisposed. Id. at 376.
75 Id. at 376. Twigg had been introduced to Kubica by Neville. Id. Entrapment may normally be pleaded only by those induced through government agents. Id. at 381.
76 Id. at 380, 381.
77 Id. at 377. Russell and Hampton were the two cases that dealt with this issue. Id.
78 Id. See note 49 supra.
79 Id. at 381. Although Neville had previously been convicted on drug charges, "he was
peacefully minding his own affairs" at the time Kubica made contact. Id.
80 Id. at 377. See note 58 supra.
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two in regard to conception of the crime. 8 1 Moreover, the distribution of narcotics would normally demand greater expediency for successful detection and generate a higher threshold of acceptable governmental comportment.8 2 The court in Twigg grasped that the key
to Hampton and Russell lay in their very bequest of the due process
possibility, to be assumed by an appropriate case where official behavior indeed shocked a " 'universal sense of justice.' "3
Simultaneously, Judge Rosenn articulated the balance that exists
between societal safeguarding of personal privacy and social desire for
efficacious enforcement of drug laws. 8 4 Yet, notwithstanding an appreciation of the challenges faced by the DEA, its overwhelming part

81 Id. at 378. But see id. at 378, n.7 and note 58 supra.

588 F.2d at 378. See Justice Powell's advisement in Hampton that factors to be considered in a due process deliberation include the type of offense and the requisite means of its
discovery. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. at 495-96 n.7. See also 588 F.2d at 378 n.6. But
see 588 F.2d at 387 (Adams, J., dissenting).
8 588 F.2d at 377 (quoting United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. at 41-42). Judge Rosenn turned
to other federal decisions to help specify the proper attributes of police "outrageousness" which
would justify an invocation of the due process clause. 588 F.2d at 379-80. In Greene v. United
States, a special investigator of bootleg whiskey became associated through an informer with defendants already engaged in manufacture. Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783, 784 (9th Cir.
1971). The still was raided and the criminals imprisoned. Id. at 784. After their release, the agent
reestablished contact and participated for a number of years in the defendants' illicit business by
providing sugar, offering to supply various equipment, and purchasing the product. Id. at 785-86.
In fact, the agent constituted the sole customer of the whiskey. Id. at 787. The court of appeals
recognized that the traditional entrapment defense was unavailable due to the defendants' predisposition, but governmental overreaching was nevertheless held to prohibit conviction. Id. at 786.
Although none of the official acts were deemed outrageous per se, their combination was sufficiently excessive to warrant the court's concern. Id. at 787. "[W]hen the Government permits
itself to become enmeshed in criminal activity, from beginning to end .... the same underlying
objections which render entrapment repugnant to American criminal justice are operative." Id.
The court in Twigg aligned itself with Greene and distinguished United States v. Leja and
United States v. Smith, where fundamental fairness defenses were rejected. 588 F.2d at 379-80.
See United States v. Leja, 563 F.2d 244 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Smith, 538 F.2d 1359
(9th Cir. 1976). In both Leja and Smith, the criminal germ was nurtured by the defendants before
DEA officials appeared to further entice the wrongdoing. 588 F.2d at 380. Hence, these cases
were deemed inapplicable to Teigg, where the government "lure[d] the defendant into a conspiracy." Id.
Judge Rosenn also mentioned United States v. West, where an entrapment defense (objective
approach) was maintained on the ground of intolerable police conduct when an informant persuaded a friend and hitherto innocent person to sell diluted heroin to an undercover officer. Id. at
379. See United States v. West, 511 F.2d 1083, 1085 (3d Cir. 1975). But see 511 F.2d at 1086,
where the West court acknowledged as well the absence of predisposition to commit the crime
(subjective approach).
588 F.2d at 380. "Infiltration of criminal operations by informers and undercover agents is
an accepted and necessary practice." Id. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. at 381
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d at 677.
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in the drama of the case sub judice could not be countenanced. 8 5 A
review of the facts displayed that Kubica, an informer, had propositioned Neville to manufacture the amphetamine. 8 6 DEA agents
provided a location for production and ensured supply of a critical
ingredient which defendants might not have been able to procure
independently. 8 7 Chemical distribution centers were notified to provide materials to Kubica who would operate under the alias, "Chem
Kleen." 8 8 Kubica purchased almost all the equipment, 89 managed
the laboratory, and constituted the sole party possessed with technical
expertise. 90 Assistance tendered by the defendants was trivial and at
the instruction of the informer. 9 1 Drawing these facts together,
Judge Rosenn ruled that such dramatic governmental intromission
92
trespassed upon outstanding principles of fundamental fairness.
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Adams argued that the degree of
interference in the criminal process had been immoderate rather than
unconstitutional. 9 3 DEA initiative in the case at bar had failed to
manifest the "outrageousness" dictated by Hampton as the emblem of
a due process defense; 94 the Twigg majority had thus abused an alternative proffered by the Supreme Court to be utilized only in the

85 588 F.2d at 380.
86 Id. The court insinuated that Kubica's motivation as informant was questionable, since his
own criminal sentence stood to be lightened by such performance. Id.
87 Id. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
88 588 F.2d at 380.
89 Id.
Twigg obtained a separatory funnel, but at Kubica's order. Id.
90

Id. at 380-81.

91 Id. at 381. The court evinced surprise that the government would diminish the jail term
of Kubica, who had possibly operated as many as one hundred speed laboratories, in order to
convict Neville and Twigg, who lacked scientific ability needed to establish one laboratory. Id.
n.9. In addition, at the time Kubica effected communication with Neville, the latter had not
exhibited any criminal intentions which would logically warrant DEA scrutiny. Id. at 381. But
see id. at 388 (Adams, J., dissenting) where it is suggested that Neville's "contacts" made him a
worthy target.
92 Id.
at 381. Although Twigg would normally not lie within the sphere of protection
radiated by a traditional entrapment defense, see note 75 supra, the more novel due process
approach could embrace this issue in his favor. Id. at 381-82. Especially convincing to the court
was the absence of Twigg's contribution to the scheme-he offered nothing in regard to capital,
equipment or ingenuity. Id. at 382. He appeared on the criminal scene the very day laboratory
production commenced; the defendants were arrested one week later. Id. at 376. Twigg's involvement stemmed from a debt he owed to Neville, and, accordingly, it is probable that he
would not even have profited from future sale of the drug. Id.
Twigg's release was also mandated by the "general rule . . . that one conspirator cannot be
convicted if all of the co-conspirators have been acquitted." Id. at n.11. See note 1 supra.
93 Id. at 383, 386 (Adams, J., dissenting).
9 Id. at 383, 385 (Adams, J., dissenting). See 425 U.S. at 495 n.7.
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rarest of circumstances. 9 5 Although Judge Adams questioned the
ethical wisdom of such law enforcement practices generally, 96 he
maintained that their ultimate legitimacy in terms of fundamental
fairness did not rest upon any establishment of governmental intervention. 9 7 Twigg, as the progeny of Hampton and Russell, should
have inherited their judicial philosophy and rejected nullification of
98
sullied but licit police action.
Twigg augments the controversy which has surrounded entrapment from its very inception as a recognized doctrine. Two discrepancies as to the facts underlie the conflicting viewpoints articulated in Twigg. Despite a jury finding of predisposition to commit the
crime, 99 the majority tends to minimize the defendants' criminal initiative' 0 0 while the dissent tends to maximize it. 10 1 Likewise, the
majority's emphasis on governmental technique is also inversely
proportionate to the minority's treatment of it. 1 0 2 The essential

95 588 F.2d at 385 (Adams, J., dissenting). Judge Adams construed the facts in Twigg to be
less meritorious of due process consideration than those in Hampton, where the defense was
ultimately defeated. Id. at 386 (Adams, J., dissenting). Firstly, the DEA had furnished contraband in Hampton. Id. Secondly, government stimulation of the crime, present in both cases,
was common to undercover enterprises. Id. Finally, government provision of an isolated farmhouse in Twtigg was justified in view of Neville's prior threat to guard the laboratory with a
shotgun. Id. n.12 (Adams, J., dissenting).
Judge Adams suggested that the majority's reliance on other federal decisions was similarly
inappropriate. Id. at 386 (Adams, J., dissenting). United States v. West was effectively overruled
by United States v. Hampton, id., and Greene v. United States concerned less demonstrable
overreaching than appeared in Hampton or Twigg. Id. n. 15 (Adams, J., dissenting).
96 Id. at 383, 389 (Adams, J., dissenting).
97 Id. at 387 (Adams, J., dissenting). Several reasons were forwarded by the dissent as a
basis for this theory. Id. Primarily, consensual crime detection often encompassed forms of
enticement. Id. n. 17 (Adams, J., dissenting). Hampton had similarly focused on government
involvement and yet the Court had still refused to sanction a due process defense. Id. at 387
(Adams, J., dissenting). The causal relationship between government maneuver and due process
reaction was further undermined in that any contention of official inducement was actually
linked to the concept of predisposition, which, in turn, formed the very breath of a traditional
entrapment defense. Id. In light of the fact that Neville had readily acceded to Kubica's illegal
suggestion, id. at 387-88 n. 18 (Adams, J., dissenting), neither defendant deserved to profit from
the defense. Id. at 387 (Adams, J., dissenting). Kubica, meanwhile, had merely assumed the
same responsibilities of manufacture as had been arranged in his previous partnership with
Neville several years earlier. Id. at 388 (Adams, J., dissenting). Finally, an issue of outrageousness is dependent upon the particular set of criminal circumstances. Id. at 387 (Adams, J.,
dissenting). Skillful drug investigation has been typically preceded by forms of instigation; conversely, drug enforcement would be hampered by significant emphasis on enticement. Id. at
387-88 (Adams, J., dissenting).
98 Id. at 389 (Adams, J., dissenting).
99 Id. at 376.
100 See id. at 380-81.
101 See id. at 387 n.18 (Adams, J., dissenting).
102

Id.
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questions remain: Were the defendants in fact predisposed? Did the
government in fact instigate the crime? The disparity in analysis dividing the court is actually part of the circular configuration harkening
back to the three possible foundations for the entrapment defensesubjective, objective, or due process-since each instructs a different
focus.
Twigg is novel because it departs from familiar subjective/
objective landmarks and explores the constitutional structure of a due
process defense. 10 3 Yet each of the three perspectives on entrapment, as crystallized by the Supreme Court, is imbued with its own
virtues and pitfalls.' 0 4 The subjective rationale, focusing on the defendant, conforms to the purported aim of the law of crimes in that it
seeks to differentiate between the culpable and the innocent.10 5 The
test is continually attacked, however, for its ancillary rule of evidence
which allows the accused's predisposition to be proven by hearsay,
rumor, and prior criminal record. 106 Thus, the very purpose of the
test becomes deformed through its implementation, since tolerable
police behavior is measured by the particular defendant's quality of
reputation, which, in turn, perpetuates a discriminatory law enforce10 7
ment.
On the other hand, an objective definition of entrapment, emphasizing the nature of governmental participation in the crime, is
commendable in its attempt to protect the integrity of the judicial

103 Twigg's impact on the future direction of entrapment is discussed in a recent New Jersey
bank robbery case, where the factual interplay between criminal intent and governmental
seduction parallels that found in Twigg. United States v. Parsons, No. 78-356 (D.N.J., filed
Mar. 2, 1979). As their predecessors had done, the defendants in Parsons conceded predisposition to commit the offense but alleged that the extent of official involvement was an outrage and
a violation of their rights to due process. Id. at 1-2. District Court Judge Meanor ruled that
Twigg failed to dictate the outcome of the case sub judice due to a single but intrinsic distinction that the Parsons defendants had originated the illegal plot. Id. at 15.
A due process contention was also rejected in a Second Circuit case where the court determined that genesis of the plan by the defendants, rather than by the government, served to
defeat the claim. United States v. Corcione, 592 F.2d 111, 113, 115 (2d Cir. 1979). The appellants were convicted of drug charges despite significant governmental overreaching. Id. at 114115.
104 Judge Adams, dissenting in Twigg, summarized the ramifications of the subjective/
objective applications of entrapment. 588 F.2d at 382-83 (Adams, J., dissenting).
10s Note 39 supra and accompanying text; Park, The Entrapment Controversy, 60 MINN. L.
RiEv. 163, 271 (1976).
106 See, e.g., United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. at 443-44 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Sherman
v. United States, 356 U.S. at 382-83 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
107 411 U.S. at 443-44 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Due to the likelihood that the jury will find
predisposition, the government may engage in extreme methods to entice the defendant marked
by a criminal record. Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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system and deter misconduct of police and informers.' 0 8 However,
the practical consequences of the objective view may undermine its
original goals where the process leads to acquittal of defendants who
deserve punishment, rather than freedom, for violating the law. 10 9
Standardized police procedures may be difficult to formulate due to
the properties of undercover investigation. 1 10 Finally, the objective
construct is flawed in that it does not appreciate the constitutional
implications which arise upon unlawful governmental comportment.' 1 '
A non-entrapment due process defense, centering on the impropriety of official action, augurs equal treatment of all defendants
in its disregard of an accused's criminal history. 11 2 The defendant is
ensured protection in both state and federal trials through insulation
of the fundamental fairness doctrine from legislative enactment as
well as through the continued sustenance of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments. 1 13 A due process alternative intensifies the rights of
the criminal-individual by according constitutional status to principles
of entrapment. The harbinger of such a defense is police action so
outrageous that it shocks the conscience of the court and offends a
universal and humane sense of justice.' 1 4
In United States v. Twigg, the extent of police intrusion in creating and executing the crime was thus found unconstitutional. 1 1 5 By
initiating contact with the defendant and proposing the criminal idea
itself, and by providing the materials, site and expertise required to
commit the offense, DEA officials were held to have crossed the
boundary of legitimate law enforcement into forbidden territory of
repugnant police tactics. 1 16 The court ruled that, in fundamental
fairness, defendants who were victims of such tainted practices must
be released. 117
10 See 356 U.S. at 385 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); ALl MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.10,
Comment at 20 (Tentative Draft 1959). The exclusionary rule, utilized in certain areas of criminal law, shares these intentions. See note 11 infra.
109 See note 118 infra and accompanying text.
110 See, e.g., United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. at 432 (infiltration of narcotics ring lawful

due to difficulties of traditional investigative techniques in the drug field).
"I Comment, The Viability of the Entrapment Defense in the Constitutional Context, 59
IOWA L. REv. at 660.
112 This is also the ideal of the objective test. 411 U.S. at 439-45 (Stewart,
113

J.,

dissenting).

See Comment, supra note 111, at 660.

IOWA L. REv. at 660.
14 United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d at 377 (quoting United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. at
431-32).
115 588 F.2d at 380-81.
116Id.

117

Id. at 380-82.
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Herein lies, at once, both the beauty and flaw of the due process
alternative to entrapment as exemplified by Twigg. Although legal
integrity may justify establishing an impediment to prosecution where
police have exceeded their authority to expose the wrongdoer, freedom for the equally blameworthy defendant is a questionable result. 1 18 To liberate the criminal in order to discipline the police is an
attractive but anomalous measure of justice in this context.119
Yet a broader range of vision is possible. The entrapment doctrine has been a child of the courts' concern since the twentieth century sophistication of the agent-provocateur device. Judicial uneasiness in regard to this contemporary type of law enforcement rests
upon several factors. Police undercover activities which seek to anticipate crime rather than unmask it, as in Twigg, may unwittingly
aggravate the number of offenses committed. 120 Designs which depend upon large expenditures of finances and human resources in
order to net the small-time criminal may be of negligible social
value.1 2 ' Federal agents endanger their integrity by becoming an
inseparable part of the vice they set out to eliminate. 122
-Il Neville and Twigg intended to violate the law; had Kubica been a confederate, rather
than an informer, their convictions undoubtedly would have been sustained. Twigg's acquittal is
especially notable since he was not a direct object of the governmental snare. See note 75 supra
and accompanying text.
119 See United States v. Parsons, No. 78-356 at 16 (D.N.J. Mar. 2, 1979). There Judge
Meanor stated:
Courts struggle to keep executive law enforcement activity within constitutional
bounds with limited weapons to utilize against unlawful enforcement of the law.
The only weapon easily available is to prevent trial or vacate a conviction. This frees
the guilty on grounds having nothing to do with their criminal responsibility ...
but [it] is only done in the interests of a judicial duty more fundamental than criminal law administration-adhering to the commands of the Constitution.
Id.
Similar concerns are present in other areas of criminal law, where the exclusionary rule has
been invoked to suppress evidence that is the fruit of overreaching governmental action. 411
U.S. at 430; see notes 108-09 supra and accompanying text. The entrapment remedy is distinct
in that it leads to dismissal of the charge itself. Nevertheless, the argument has been raised that
the same principles of due process which stimulated the Supreme Court to muster its supervisory powers and create the exclusionary rule in regard to illegal searches, seizures, and confessions, should be applied to entrapment. 411 U.S. at 430-31. The Court rejected such contentions in United States v. Russell. id. Furthermore, Justice Rehnquist opined in Hampton v.
United States that illicit police action should result in prosecution of the police rather than in
release of the guilty defendant. 425 U.S. at 490.
120 "An investigator for a Senate Subcommittee concerned with federal drug enforcement, in
noting that almost ten million dollars a year was being poured into the narcotics trade by the
government, suggests that this may be subsidizing organized crime.'" Marx, Undercover Cops:
Creative Policing or Constitutional Threat?, 4 CIVIL LIBERTIES REV. 34, 43 (1977).
121 Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. at 498 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Greene v. United
States, 454 F.2d at 788 (Merrill, J., dissenting).
122 See, e.g., United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d at 676-77.
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At the pinnacle of such considerations is the role of the judiciary
as a stabilizing force between governmental thrust and public expectation. 123 Implicit in the function of the court is the duty to ensure
that policeman and citizen alike abide by the legal structure in which
we live. Constitutional notions may not be twisted to permit the abolition of crime by criminal means. "If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a
law unto himself; it invites anarchy."124 Within this realm, Twigg
signifies a fidelity to the essence of our Constitution.
Jeri Elena Ruscoll

123

Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. at 380 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Casey v. United

States, 276 U.S. at 423-25 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
124 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

